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Abstract
The analysis of markets with indivisible goods and fixed exogenous prices has played an
important role in economic models, especially in relation to wage rigidity and unemployment.
This research report provides a mathematical and computational details associated to the
mathematical programming based approaches proposed by Nasini et al. [21] to study pure
exchange economies where discrete amounts of commodities are exchanged at fixed prices.
Barter processes, consisting in sequences of elementary reallocations of couple of commodities
among couples of agents, are formalized as local searches converging to equilibrium allocations.
A direct application of the analyzed processes in the context of computational economics is
provided, along with a Java implementation of the approaches described in this research report.
Key words: Microeconomic Theory, Combinatorial optimization, Multiobjective optimiza-
tion, Multiagent systems.
1 Introduction
The bargaining problem concerns the allocation of a fixed quantity among a set of
self-interested agents. The characterizing element of a bargaining problem is that many
allocations might be simultaneously suitable for all the agents.
Definition 1. Let V ⊂ Rn be the space of allocations of an n agents bargaining problem.
Points in V can be compared by saying that v∗ ∈ V strictly dominates v ∈ V if each
component of v∗ is not less than the corresponding component of v and at least one
component is strictly greater, that is, vi ≤ v
∗
i for each i and vi < v
∗
i for some i. This
is written as v ≺ v∗. Then, the Pareto frontier is the set of points of V that are not
strictly dominated by others.
Since the very beginning of the Economic Theory [16, 13], the bargaining problem
has generally be adopted as the basic mathematical framework for the study of mar-
kets of excludable and rivalrous goods and a long-standing line of research focused on
axiomatic approaches for the determination of a uniquely allocation, satisfying agent’s
interests (for details, see Nash [20] and Rubinstein [25]).
More recently, an increasing attention has been devoted to the cases where the quan-
tity to be allocated is not infinitesimally divisible. The technical difficulties associated
to those markets have been pointed out since Shapley and Shubik [28], who character-
ized the equilibria of markets where each agent can consume at most one indivisible
good. After them, many authors have been studying markets with indivisible goods
(see for example, Kaneko [17], Quinzii [24], Scarf [27], and the most recent literature
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like Danilov et al. [11], Caplin and Leahy [8]). The main focus was to address the ques-
tion of existence of market clearing prices in the cases of not infinitesimally divisible
allocations.
Another subclass of the family of bargaining problems is associated to markets
with fixed prices (for details, see Dreze [12] and Auman and Dreze [3]), which have
played an important role in maroeconomic models, especially on those models related
to wage rigidities and unemployment. Dreze [12] described price rigidity as inequality
constraints on individual prices.
Efficient algorithms to find non-dominated Pareto allocations of bargaining problems
associated to markets with not infinitesimally divisible goods and fixed exogenous prices
have been recently studied by Vazirani et al. [30] and by Ozlen, Azizoglu and Burton
[23]. Our goal is to provide novel mathematical-programming based approaches to
analyze barter processes, which are commonly used in everyday life by economic agents
to solve bargaining problems associated to n-consumer-m-commodity markets of not
infinitesimally divisible goods and fixed exogenous prices. These processes are based
on elementary reallocations (ER) of two commodities among two agents, sequentially
selected from the m(m − 1)n(n − 1)/4 possible combinations. Under fixed prices,
markets do not clear and the imbalance between supply and demand is resolved by
some kind of quantity rationing [12]. In out analysis this quantity rationing is implicit
in the process and not explicitly taken into account.
Based on this multi-agent approach, many economical systems might be simulated
[32], as we will see in the computational application illustrated in section 5.
Section 2 illustrates the fundamental properties of the allocation space. Section 3
provides a general mathematical programming formulation and derives an analytical
expression for the Pareto frontier of the elementary reallocation problem (ERP). It
will be shown that the sequence of elementary reallocations (SER) (the chain of ERP
performed by agents along the interaction process) follows the algorithmic steps of a
local search in the integer allocation space with exogenous prices. Section 4 introduce
the case of network structures restricting agents interactions to be performed only
among adjacent agents. In section 5 the performance of these barter processes is
compared with the one of a global optimization algorithm (branch and cut).
Most of the results presented in this research reports has been studied by Nasini et
al. [21].
2 The integer allocation space with fixed prices
The key characteristic of an economy is: a collection A of n agents, a collection C of
m types of commodities, a commodity space X (usually represented by the nonnegative
orthant in Rm), the initial endowments qij ∈ X for i ∈ A, j ∈ C (representing a budget of
initial amount of commodities owned by each agent), a preference relation i on X for
each agent i ∈ A. Arrow and Debreu [2] showed that if the set {(x, y) ∈ X×X : x i y}
is closed relative to X ×X the preference relation can be represented by a real-valued
function ui : X 7−→ R, such that, for each a and b belonging to X, ui(a) 6 ui(b) if and
only if a  b.
When agents attempt to simultaneously maximize their respective utilities, condi-
tioned to balance constraints, the resulting problems are maxui(x) s.to
∑
i∈A x
i
j =∑
i∈A q
i
j for j ∈ C, where x
i
j ∈ X, is the amount of commodity j demanded by agent i
(from now on the superindex shall denote the agent and the subindex shall denote the
2
commodity).
Arrow and Debreu [2] showed that under certain economic conditions (convex prefer-
ences, perfect competition and demand independence) there must be a vector of prices
P̂ = (p̂1, p̂2, p̂3, . . . , p̂m)
T , such that aggregate supplies will equal aggregate demands
for every commodity in the economy.
As studied by Dreze [12], when prices are regarded as fixed, markets do not clear
and the imbalance between supply and demand is resolved by some kind of quantity
rationing. The system of linear constraints associated a n-consumer-m-commodity
market with fixed prices exhibits a block angular structure with rank m+ n− 1:

p1 p2 . . . pm
p1 p2 . . . pm
. . .
p1 p2 . . . pm
I I . . . I
 x =

p1q
1
1 + . . .+ pmq
1
m
p1q
2
1 + . . .+ pmq
2
m
...
p1q
n
1 + . . .+ pmq
n
m
q1 + . . . + qn
 , (1)
where p1, . . . , pm are relative prices between commodities, q
i = (qi1, . . . , q
i
m)
T , and
x = (x11, . . . , x
1
m, . . . , x
n
1 , . . . , x
n
m)
T . The constraints matrix of (1) could also be written
as
(
I ⊗ P
1⊗ I
)
, where P = (p1, p2, p3, . . . , pm) and ⊗ is the Kronecker product between
two matrices. Note that the linking constrains (i.e., the conservation of commodities
(1 ⊗ I)x = q1 + . . . + qn) are implied by the balance equations of a network flow
among the agents. This fact will be analyzed in Section 5, where we introduced costs
associated to the flow.
All the feasible allocations lay in a (m+ n − 1) dimensional hyperplane defined by
the prices (always containing at least one solution, which is represented by the vector of
initial endowments q), and restricted to the fact that agents are rational: ui(x) ≥ ui(q),
for i ∈ V.
Proposition 1 below shows that an asymptotic approximation of an upper bound of
the number of nonnegative solutions of (1) is O(n
(mb)
bm
), where b is the average amount
of each commodity, i.e., b =
∑m
j=1(
∑n
h=1 v
h
j )
m
.
Proposition 1. Let Λ be the set of nonnegative solutions of (1), i.e., the allocation
space of a problem of bargaining integer amounts of m commodities among n agents
with fixed prices. If the allocation space satisfies the mild conditions bj =
∑n
h=1 v
h
j ≥ n
and bj ∈ O(n), j = 1, . . . ,m (where bj is the overall amount of commodity j in the
system), then |Λ| ∈ O(n
(mb)
bm
).
Proof. The set of nonnegative solutions of (1) is a subset of the union of bounded sets,
as Λ ⊂
⋃m
j=1{(x
1
j . . . x
n
j ) ∈ R
n : x1j + . . .+x
n
j = v
1
j + . . .+v
n
j ;x
1
j . . . x
n
j ≥ 0}. Therefore,
Λ is a finite set, as it is the intersection between Z and a bounded subset of Rmn. Let
Λ′ be the set of nonnegative solutions of (1), without considering the price constraints,
i.e., the n diagonal blocks p1x
h
1 + p2x
h
2 + . . . + pmx
h
m = p1v
h
1 + p2v
h
2 + . . . + pmv
h
m, for
h = 1, . . . , n. We know that |Λ′| ≥ |Λ|. However, |Λ′| can be easily calculated, as the
number of solutions of m independent Diophantine equations with unitary coefficients.
The number of nonnegative integer solutions of any equation of the form
∑n
h=1 x
h
j =
bj, j = 1, . . . ,m, might be seen as the number of distributions of bj balls among m
boxes:
(n+bj−1)!
(n−1)! bj !
. Since we have m independent Diophantine equations of this form,
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then the number of possible solutions for all of them is
∏m
j=1
(n+bj−1)!
(n−1)! bj !
. Thus, we know
that |Λ| ≤
∏m
j=1
(n+bj−1)(n+bj−2)...n
bj !
≤
∏m
j=1
(n+bj−1)
bj
bj !
≤
∏m
j=1(n+bj−1)
bj
bm
, where the last
inequality holds because bj ≥ n ≥ 2. Since bj ∈ O(n) we have that
∏m
j=1(n+bj−1)
bj
bm
∈
O(n
(mb)
bm
). Hence, |Λ| ∈ O(n
(mb)
bm
).
The set of nonnegative solutions of (1) represent the allocation space associated to
a market with fixed prices where the quantity to be allocated is not infinitesimally
divisible. The technical difficulties associated to those markets have been pointed out
since Shapley and Shubik [28], who characterized the equilibria of markets where each
agent can consume at most one indivisible good. After them, many authors have been
studying markets with indivisible goods (see for example, Kaneko [17], Quinzii [24],
Scarf [27], and the most recent literature like Danilov et al. [11], Caplin and Leahy
[8]). The main focus was to address the question of existence of market clearing prices
in the cases of not infinitesimally divisible allocations.
Another subclass of the family of bargaining problems is associated to markets
with fixed prices (for details, see Dreze [12] and Auman and Dreze [3]), which have
played an important role in maroeconomic models, especially on those models related
to wage rigidities and unemployment. Under fixed prices, markets do not clear and the
imbalance between supply and demand is resolved by some kind of quantity rationing
[12]. In out analysis this quantity rationing is implicit in the process and not explicitly
taken into account.
We now set the problem of bargaining integer amounts of m commodities among
n agents with fixed prices in a general mathematical programming framework. The
aim is to construct a local search in the allocation space, based on as a sequence of
elementary reallocations.
As previously seen, the linear system characterizing the space of possible allocations
is (1). Here the conservation of commodity (i.e., the overall amount of commodity of
each type must be preserved) is generalized to include arbitrary weights in the last
m rows of (1). Based on this observation consider, Nasini et al. [21] proposed the
following multi-objective integer non-linear optimization problem (MINOP):
max [ui(x), i = 1, . . . , n] (2a)
s. to
P
P
. . .
P
d1I d2I . . . dnI
 x =

b1
b2
...
bn
b0
 (2b)
ui(x) ≥ ui(q) i = 1 . . . , n
x ∈ Zmn ≥ 0,
(2c)
where ui : Rmn → R, P ∈ Q1×m, di ∈ Q, bi ∈ Q, i = 1, . . . , n, and b0 ∈ Qm. The
conditions ui(x) ≥ ui(q), i = 1 . . . , n, guarantee that no agent gets worse under a
feasible reallocation, which is known in general bargaining literature as the disagreement
point. The constraint matrix has a primal block-angular structure with n identical
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diagonal blocks involving m decision variables. Problem (1) is a particular case of (2)
for di = 1, i = 1, . . . , n.
From a multi-objective optimization point of view, a suitable technique to generate
the Pareto frontier of (2) is the ε-constraint method, which is based on converting all
but one objectives into constraints. By varying the lower bounds of these constraints
the exact Pareto front can theoretically be generated. This multi-objective optimiza-
tion technique was proposed by Haimes, Lasdon and Wismert [15]. Recently, efficient
algorithms to find non-dominated Pareto allocations of bargaining problems associated
to markets with not infinitesimally divisible goods and fixed exogenous prices have
been studied by Vazirani et al. [30] and by Ozlen, Azizoglu and Burton [22, 23], who
developed a general approach to generate all nondominated objective vectors, by re-
cursively identifying upper bounds on individual objectives using problems with fewer
objectives.
2.1 A specialized interior point method for markets with fixed prices
We introduce in this section a specialized interior point method to deal with the
continuous relaxation of (2), as long as the utility functions uh(x), for h = 1, . . . , n, are
concave. This method is based on the the specialized point algorithm for block-angular
linear programs, introduced by Castro [?, ?].
Consider a modified version of problem (2), in which the linking constraints are
relaxed in the form of inequalities: [d1I I . . . dnI]x + x0 = b
0, where 0 ≤ x ≤ uv
and 0 ≤ x0 ≤ us; the integrality constraints are relaxed, so that x ∈ R
mn ≥ 0 and the
multi-objective utility function is replaced by the aggregated utility:
∑n
h=1 αhu
h(x),
where α1, . . . , αn are positive weights. The inequalities associated to the disagreement
point (agents rationality) are replaced by equality constraints: uh(x)−uh(q)− sh = 0,
for h = 1 . . . , n, where 0 ≤ s ≤ us are slack variables, for h = 1 . . . n.
We call this modified version of (2) the Modified Continuous Allocation Problem
with Fixed Prices (MCAPFP). Note that when uv goes to zero and us goes to in-
finity the x solution of the MCAPFP coincides with the one of the maximization of∑n
h=1 αhu
h(x) in the continuous relaxation of nonnegative solutions of (1). If we let
A ∈ Qn+m×mn+m be the coefficient matrix associated to MCAPFP, the resulting µ-
KKT conditions [?] are:
Ax = b,
uh(x)− uh(q)− sh = 0 h = 1 . . . , n,
ATy + zv −wv +
n∑
h=1
th
[
∇uh(x)
0
]
=
n∑
h=1
αh
[
∇uh(x)
0
]
Tes + zs −ws = 0
XZvev = µev,
(U −X)Wvev = µev,
SZses = µes,
(U − S)Wses = µes,
(3)
where ev ∈ R
nm+m and es ∈ R
n are a vectors of ones; y ∈ Rm+n and zv ,wv ∈
Rnm+m
+∪{0}
are the Lagrange multipliers (or dual variables) of Ax = b and x ≥ 0, x ≤ uv
respectively; similarly, t = [t1 . . . tn]
T ∈ Rn is the vector of Lagrangian multipliers
of uh(x) − uh(q) + sh = 0, for h = 1 . . . , n and zs,ws ∈ R
2n
+∪{0} are the Lagrange
multipliers of s ≥ 0, s ≤ u respectively. Primal variables must be inside the intervals
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0 < x < uv, 0 < s < us, 0 < x0 < uv. Matrices X,Zv , Uv,Wv ∈ R
(nm+m)×(nm+m) are
diagonal matrices made up of vectors x, zv ,uv ,wv; matrices S, T, Zs, Us,Ws ∈ R
n×n
are diagonal matrices made up of vectors s, t, zs,us,ws. Matrix T ∈ R
n×n is diagonal
with components t1, . . . , tn.
Applying Newton method to (3) and reducing the barrier parameter µ at each
iteration, we have that the x solution of (3) converge to the optimal allocation of the
MCAPFP. The Newton’s direction (∆x,∆s,∆y,∆t,∆zv ,∆zs ,∆wv ,∆ws) is obtained by
solving the following system in each iteration.
A
V −I
Q AT V T
I -I
−I
Zv X
Zs S
−Wv Uv −X
−Ws Us − S


∆x
∆s
∆y
∆t
∆zv
∆zs
∆wv
∆ws

=

r1
r2
r3
r4
r5
r6
r7
r8

(4)
where the right-hand term is defined as
r1 = Ax− b
r2 =
 u
1(x)− u1(q)− s1
...
un(x)− un(q)− sn

r3 = A
Ty + z−w −
n∑
h=1
(th − αh)
[
∇u1(x)
0
]
r4 = Tes + zs −ws
r5 = XZvev − µev
r6 = XZses − µes
r7 = (Uv −X)Wvev − µev
r8 = (Us −X)Wses − µes
. (5)
Under the assumptions that
∂uh(x)
∂xki
= 0 for h 6= k (i.e., uh only depends on xh ), which
are quite reasonable requirements for consumer utilities, then matrix Q(x) results to
be block-diagonal:
Q(x) =

Q1(x)
Q2(x)
. . .
Qn(x)
0
 , (6)
where, for each agent h = 1, . . . , n and each couple of commodities i, j = 1, . . . ,m, we
have Qh(x) ∈ R
m×m to be defined as:
Qhij(x) = (t
h − αh)
∂2uh(x)
∂xhj
∂xhi
. (7)
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Matrix V ∈ Rmn+m×n is also block-diagonal:
V =

∇u1(x)T
0
∇u2(x)T
. . .
∇un(x)T
 . (8)
By collecting variables ∆x̂ = [∆x | ∆s], ∆ŷ = [∆y | ∆t], ∆ẑ = [∆zv | ∆zs ] and
∆ŵ = [∆wv | ∆ws] and performing elementary row operations, system (4) might be
reduced to 
Â
Θ̂ ÂT
X̂−1Ẑ I
−(Û − X̂)−1Ŵ I


∆x̂
∆ŷ
∆ẑ
∆ŵ
 =

r̂1
r̂2
r̂3
r̂4
 , (9)
where Â ∈ R2(n+m)×(nm+n+m) is defined as:
Â =
[
A
V −I
]
. (10)
and Ẑ ∈ R(nm+n+m)×(nm+n+m), X̂ ∈ R(nm+n+m)×(nm+n+m), Ŵ ∈ R(nm+n+m)×(nm+n+m),
Û ∈ R(nm+n+m)×(nm+n+m) are also defined by concatenating the corresponding di-
agonal matrices in (4), as well as the right-hand term: r̂4 = −(Û − X̂)
−1[r7 | r8],
r̂3 = X̂
−1[r5 | r6], r̂2 = [r3 | r4]− r̂3 + r̂4, r̂1 = [r1 | r2]. Thus, variables ∆zv ,∆zs ,∆wv
and ∆ws might be eliminated after solving the indefinite augmented form:[
Â
Θ̂ ÂT
][
∆x̂
∆ŷ
]
=
[
r̂1
r̂2
]
, (11)
Matrix Θ̂ ∈ R(nm+m+n)×(nm+m+n) is
Θ̂ =
[
Θx
Θs
]
=
[
Q−X−1Zv + (Uv −X)Wv
−S−1Zs + (Us − S)Ws
]
, (12)
where Θx ∈ R(nm+m)×(nm+m) and Θs ∈ Rn×n. Multiplying by −AΘ−1 the last block
of equations and summing it to the first one, we obtain that the coefficient matrix of
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the system to be solved to compute ∆y is
ÂΘ̂ÂT =
[
AΘxAT AΘxV T
VΘxAT VΘxV T −Θs
]
=

PΘx1P
T d1PΘ
x
1 PΘ
x
1∇u1
. . .
...
. . .
PΘnP
T dnPΘ
x
n PΘ
x
n∇
T
u1
d1Θ
x
1P
T . . . dnΘ
x
nP
T Θ0 +
n∑
h=1
d2hΘ
x
h d1Θ
x
1∇u1 . . . dnΘ
x
n∇un
∇T
u1
Θx1P
T d1∇
T
u1
Θx1 ∇
T
u1
Θx1∇u1 −Θ
s
1
. . .
...
. . .
∇TunΘ
x
nP
T dn∇
T
unΘ
x
n ∇
T
unΘ
x
n∇un −Θ
s
n

=
 B C0 C1CT0 D0 DT∇
CT1 D∇ D1
 ,
(13)
where
∇uh =

∂uh(x)
∂xhm
...
∂uh(x)
∂xhm
 h = 1, . . . , n. (14)
Thus, by noting that the first n components of the Newton direction ∆y are associated
to the block-angular constraints
∑
i∈C pix
h
i =
∑
i∈C piq
h
i , for h = 1, . . . , n, whereas
the second m components of ∆y are associated to the linking constraints
∑
h∈A x
h
i =∑
h∈A v
h
i , for i = 1, . . . ,m, we define ∆y = [∆y1 ∆y2 ] and see that the system to be
solved to compute ∆y is
ÂΘ̂ÂT∆ŷ =
 B C0 C1CT0 D0 DT∇
CT1 D∇ D1
 ∆y1∆y2
∆t
 =
 g1g2
g3

= r̂1 − ÂΘ̂
−1r̂2,
(15)
so that we can sequentially solve the following two systems[
D0 − C
T
0 B
−1C0 D
T
∇ − C
T
0 B
−1C1
D∇ − C
T
1 B
−1C0 D1 − C
T
1 B
−1C1
] [
∆y2
∆t
]
=
([
g2
g3
]
−
[
CT0
CT1
]
B−1g1
)
,
(16)
B∆y1 =
(
g1 −
[
C0 C1
] [ ∆y2
∆t
])
(17)
System (17) is directly solvable, as B ∈ Rn×n is diagonal, so that the main computa-
tional effort is to solve (16). However, the structure of (16) might also been exploited,
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by noting that D1 − C
T
1 B
−1C1 ∈ R
n×n is a diagonal matrix and rewriting (16) in the
form
Θ0 +
∑n
h=1 d
2
hΥh d
2
1Υ1∇u1 . . . d
2
nΥn∇un
d21∇
T
u1
Υ1 ∇
T
u1
Υ1∇u1 −Θ
s
1
...
. . .
d2n∇
T
unΥn ∇
T
unΥn∇un −Θ
s
n

[
∆y2
∆t
]
=
[
DΥ CΥ
CTΥ BΥ
] [
∆y2
∆t
]
=
[
g2 −C
T
0 B
−1g1
g3 −C
T
1 B
−1g1
]
,
(18)
where
Υh = Θ
x
h −
ΘxhP
TPΘxh
PΘxhP
T
, h = 1, . . . , n. (19)
By eliminating ∆t from the first group of equations in (18), we obtain
(DΥ − C
T
ΥB
−1
Υ CΥ)∆y2 = gΥ1 (20a)
BΥ∆t = gΥ2 (20b)
where gΥ1 = g2 −C
T
0 B
−1g1− g2 −C
T
ΥB
−1
Υ (g3 −C
T
1 B
−1g1) and gΥ2 = g3 −C
T
1 B
−1g1−
CΥ∆y2 . Since BΥ is diagonal, ∆t can be directly obtained, so that solving (4) – a
system of size 2(n+m) – reduced to the much smaller problem (20a) – a system of size
m –.
2.2 The elementary reallocation problem
The nice properties of the specialized interior point method cannot be exploited when
dealing with indivisible goods and combinatorial algorithm might be taken into account.
The aim of this section is to consider a general bartering scheme which is unambiguously
applied to both discrete and continuous allocation spaces.
In everyday life, barter processes among people tends to achieve the Pareto frontier
of problem (2) by a sequence of reallocations. We consider a process based on a sequence
of two-commodity-two-agent reallocations, denoted as SER. Any step of this sequence
requires the solution of a MINOP involving 4 variables and 4 constraints of problem
(2).
Let q be a feasible solution of (2b) and (2c) and suppose we want to produce a
feasible change of 4 variables, such that 2 of them belong to the ith and jth position of
the diagonal block h and the other belong to the ith and jth position of the diagonal
block k.
It can be easily shown that a feasibility condition of any affine change of these 4
variables qhi +∆
h
i , q
k
i +∆
k
i , q
h
j +∆
h
j , q
k
j +∆
k
j is that ∆
h
i ,∆
k
i ,∆
h
j ,∆
k
j must be an integer
solution of the following system of equations
pi pj 0 0
0 0 pi pj
dh 0 dk 0
0 dh 0 dk


∆hi
∆hj
∆ki
∆kj
 =

0
0
0
0
 . (21)
The solution set are the integer points in the null space of the matrix of system (21),
which will be named A. A is a two-agent-two-commodity constraint matrix, and its
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rank is three (just note that the first column is a linear combination of the other three
using coefficients α2 =
pi
pj
, α3 =
dh
dk
and α4 = −
pid
h
pjdk
). Therefore the null space has
dimension one, and its integer solutions are found on the line
∆hi
∆hj
∆ki
∆kj
 = w

pjd
k
−pid
k
−pjd
h
pid
h
 , (22)
for some w = αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh), where α ∈ Z and F : Q4 → Q provides a factor
which transforms the null space direction in the nonzero integer null space direction
of smallest norm. We note that this factor can be computed as F (pi, pj, d
k, dh) =
G(pjd
k, pid
k, pjd
h, pid
h), where
G(vi =
ri
wi
, i = 1, . . . , l) =
lcm(wi, i = 1, . . . , l)
gcd(lcm(wi, i = 1, . . . , l) · vi, i = 1, . . . , l)
, (23)
ri and wi being the numerator and denominator of vi (wi = 1 if vi is integer), and lcm
and gcd being, respectively, the least common multiple and greatest common divisor
functions.
Hence, given a feasible point q, one can choose 4 variables, such that 2 of them
belong to the ith and jth position of a diagonal block h and the others belong to
the ith and jth position of a diagonal block k, in m(m − 1)n(n − 1)/4 ways. Each
of them constitutes an ERP, whose Pareto frontier is in q + null(A). The SER is
a local search, which repeatedly explores a neighborhood and chooses both a locally
improving direction among the m(m− 1)n(n− 1)/4 possible ERPs and a feasible step
length q = αF (pi, pj, d
k, dh), α ∈ Z. For problems of the form of (2) the SER might be
written as follows:
xt+1 = xt + αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh)

...
pjd
k
...
−pid
k
...
−pjd
h
...
pid
h
...

...
h, i
...
h, j
...
k, i
...
k, j
...
= xt + αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh)∆khij , (24)
t being the iteration counter. In shorter notation, we write (24) as xt+1 = xt + αSkhij ,
where
Skhij = F (pi, pj , d
k, dh)∆khij (25)
is a direction of integer components. Since the nonnegativity of x have to be kept along
the iterations, then we have that
−
max
{
xhi /(pjd
k), xkj /(pid
h)
}
F (pi, pj , dk, dh)
≤ α ≤
min
{
xhj /(pid
k), xki /(pjd
h)
}
F (pi, pj , dk, dh)
, (26)
or, equivalently,
−max
{
xhi /(pjd
k), xkj /(pid
h)
}
≤ w ≤ min
{
xhj /(pid
k), xki /(pjd
h)
}
. (27)
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(The step length is forced to be nonnegative when the direction is both feasible and
a descent direction; in our case the direction is only known to be feasible, and then
negative step lengths are also considered.)
An important property of an elementary reallocation is that under the assumptions
that
∂uk(x)
∂xki
: Rmn → R is (i) non increasing, (ii) nonnegative and (iii)
∂uk(x)
∂
x
j
i
= 0
for j 6= k (i.e., uk only depends on xk ), which are quite reasonable requirements for
consumer utilities, then uk(x + αSkhij ) is a unimodal function with respect to α, as
shown by the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Under the definition of uk and Skhij , for every feasible point x ∈ R
mn,
uk(x+ αSkhij ) is a unimodal function with respect to α in the interval defined by (26).
Proof. Let us define g(α) = uk(x + αSkhij ), differentiable with respect to α. It will be
shown that for all α in the interval (26), and 0 < τ ∈ R, g′(α) < 0 implies g′(α+τ) < 0,
which is a sufficient condition for the unimodality of g(α). By the chain rule, and using
(24) and (25), the derivative of g(α) can be written as
g′(α) = ∇xu
k(x+ αSkhij )S
kh
ij
= F (pi, pj , d
k, dh)
(
∂uk(x+ αSkhij )
∂xki
(−pjd
h) +
∂uk(x+ αSkhij )
∂xkj
pid
h
)
.
(28)
If g′(α) < 0 then, from (28) and since F (pi, pj, d
k, dh) > 0, we have that
∂uk(x+ αSkhij )
∂xk
i
pjd
h >
∂uk(x+ αSkhij )
∂xk
j
pid
h. (29)
Since from (24) the component (k, i) of Skhij is F (pi, pj, d
k, dh)(−pjd
h) < 0, and
∂uk(x)
∂xki
is non increasing, we have that for τ > 0
∂uk(x+ (α+ τ)Skhij )
∂xki
≥
∂uk(x+ αSkhij )
∂xki
. (30)
Similarly, since the component (k, j) of Skhij is F (pi, pj , d
k, dh)(pid
h) > 0, we have
∂uk(x+ αSkhij )
∂xkj
≥
∂uk(x+ (α+ τ)Skhij )
∂xkj
. (31)
Multiplying both sides of (30) and (31) by, respectively, pjd
h and pid
h, and connecting
the resulting inequalities with (29) we have that
∂uk(x+ (α+ τ)Skhij )
∂xki
pjd
h >
∂uk(x+ (α+ τ)Skhij )
∂xkj
pid
h,
which proofs that g′(α+ τ) < 0.
Using Proposition 2 and the characterization of the space of integer solutions of
(21), we are able to derive a closed expression of the Pareto frontier of the ERP, based
on the behavior of u(x+αSkhij ) (see Corollary 1 below), as it is shown in this example:
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Figure 1: Plots of g1(α) and g2(α), and interval of α associated to the Pareto frontier. The disagreement
point corresponds to g1(0) and g2(0), the utilities in the current iterate.
Example 1. Consider the following ERP with initial endowments [40, 188, 142, 66].
max [2− e−0.051x
1
1 − e−0.011x
1
2 , 2− e−0.1x
2
1 − e−0.031x
2
2 ]
s. to
5x11 + 10x
1
2 = 2080
5x21 + 10x
2
2 = 1370
5x11 + 6x
2
1 = 1052
5x12 + 6x
2
2 = 1336
2− e−0.05x
1
1 − e−0.01x
1
2 ≥ 1.68
2− e−0.1x
2
1 − e−0.031x
2
2 ≥ 1.50
xij ≥ 0 ∈ Z i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2;
(32)
The utility functions g1(α) = u1(x+ αS1212 ) and g
2(α) = u2(x+ αS1212 ) are
g1(α) = u1(x+ αS1212) = u
1


40
188
142
66
+ α

12
−6
−10
5

 = 2− e−0.051(40+12α) − e−0.011(188−6α)
g2(α) = u2(x+ αS1212) = u
2


40
188
142
66
+ α

12
−6
−10
5

 = 2− e−0.1(142−10α) − e−0.031(66+5α),
which are plotted in Figure 1. The continuous optimal step lengths for the two respective agents
are argmax g1(α) = 3.33 and argmax g2(α) = 8.94. Due to the unimodality of uk(x + αShkij ),
all efficient solutions of (32) are given by integer step lengths α ∈ [3.33, 8.94] (see Fig. 1), i.e.,
for α ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} we have
g1(4) = 1.82412 g1(5) = 1.81803 g1(6) = 1.80882 g1(7) = 1.79752 g1(8) = 1.78465,
g2(4) = 1.93043 g2(5) = 1.94035 g2(6) = 1.94873 g2(7) = 1.95558 g2(8) = 1.96057.
Due to the unimodality of both utility functions with respect to α, no efficient solution exists
for an α outside the segment [3.33, 8.94].
The above example illustrates a case where the segment between argmax uh(x +
αSkhij ) and argmax u
k(x+Skhij ) contains five integer points, associated with the feasible
step lengths.
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The following statements give a constructive characterization of the Pareto frontier
of an ERP for the case of concave utility function and linear utility functions respec-
tively.
Corollary 1. Let Γ be the set of integer points in the interval [adown, aup], where
adown = min{argmaxαu
k(x+αSkhij ), argmaxαu
h(x+αSkhij )} and a
up = max{argmaxαu
k(x+
αSkhij ), argmaxαu
h(x+αSkhij )}, and let[α
down, αup] be the interval of feasible step lengths
defined in (26). Then, due to Proposition 2, the set V∗ of Pareto efficient solutions of
an ERP can be obtained as follows:
i. V∗ = {[uh(x + αSkhij ), u
k(x + αSkhij )] : α ∈ Γ} if Γ is not empty and does not
contain the zero.
ii. If Γ is empty and there exists an integer point between 0 and adown but no integer
point between aup and αup then V∗ contains the unique point given by [uh(x +
αSkhij , u
k(x+ αSkhij )]such that α is the greatest integer between 0 and a
down.
iii. If Γ is empty and there exists an integer point between aup and αup but no integer
point between 0 and adown then V∗ contains either the unique point given by [uh(x+
αSkhij , u
k(x + αSkhij )] such that α is the smallest integer between a
up and αup, or
α = 0, or both of them if they do not dominate each other. (In this case the three
possibilities must be checked, since if for only one of the utilities —let it be h, for
instance— uh(x) > uh(x + α¯Skhij ), α¯ being the smallest integer between a
up and
αup, then both values 0 and α¯ are Pareto efficient.)
iv. If Γ is empty and there are integer points both between aup and αup and between 0
and adown then V ∗ contains the points given by [uh(x+αSkhij , u
k(x+αSkhij )] such
that α is either the smallest integer between aup and αup, or the greatest integer
between 0 and adown, or both points if they do not dominate each other.
v. In the case that Γ contains the zero, then no point dominates the initial endow-
ment x, so that the only point in the Pareto frontier is x.
Corollary 2. Consider the case of an economy where agents have linear utility func-
tions with gradients c1, . . . , cn and let again Γ be the set of integer points in the in-
terval [adown, aup], where adown = min{argmaxααc
kSkhij , argmaxααc
hSkhij } and a
up =
max{argmaxααc
kSkhij , argmaxααc
hSkhij }, and let [α
down, αup] be the interval of feasible
step lengths defined in (26). It might be easily seen that either Γ = Q or Γ = ∅. The
set Γ = Q in the case (chi pjd
k − chj pid
k) and (ckj pid
h − cki pjd
h) have opposite sighs,
whereas Γ = ∅ if (chi pjd
k − chj pid
k) and (ckj pid
h − cki pjd
h) have the same sign. Then,
due to Proposition 2, the set V∗ of Pareto efficient solutions of an ERP may contain
at most one point:
i. if there is at least one non-null integer between −max{xhi /(pjd
k), xkj/(pid
h)}/F (pi, pj, d
k, dh)
and min{xhj /(pid
k), xki /(pjd
h)}/F (pi, pj , d
k, dh) and Γ = ∅, then V∗ only con-
tains the unique point corresponding to the allocation xt+1 = xt+αSkhij for a step-
length α which is either equal to −max{xhi /(pjd
k) , xkj /(pid
h)}/F (pi, pj , d
k, dh) (if
(chi pjd
k - chj pid
k) and (ckj pid
h - cki pjd
h) are negative) or for equal to min{xhj /(pid
k),
xki /(pjd
h)}/F (pi, pj , d
k, dh) (if (chi pjd
k - chj pid
k) and (ckj pid
h - cki pjd
h) are posi-
tive).
ii. V∗ only contains the disagreement point in the opposite case.
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Having a characterization of the Pareto frontier for any ERP in the sequence allows
not just a higher efficiency in simulating the process but also the possibility of measuring
the number of non dominated endowments of each of the m(m− 1)n(n − 1)/4 ERPs,
which might be used as a measure of uncertainty of the process. Indeed, the uncertainty
of a barter process of this type might come from different sides: i) how to choose the
couple of agents and commodities in each step? ii) which Pareto efficient solution of
each ERP to use to update the endowments of the system? In the next subsection we
shall study different criteria for answering the first two questions.
Note that the set of non-dominated solutions of the ERP, obtained by the local
search movement (24) might give rise to imbalances between supply and demand, as
described by Dreze [12] for the continuous case. To resolve this imbalance Dreze intro-
duce a quantity rationing, which can by also extended to the ERP.
Consider a rationing scheme for the ERP as a pair of vectors l ∈ Zm, L ∈ Zm,
with L ≥ 0 ≥ l, such that the tth and (t + 1)th ER verifies li ≤ x
t+1
i − x
t
i ≤ Li, for
i = 1, . . . , n, where li and Li are the i
th components of l and L respectively. Thus, for
two given agents h and k and two given commodities i and j we have
li ≤ αF (pi, pj, d
k, dh)

...
pjd
k
...
−pjd
h
...

≤ Li, lj ≤ αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh)

...
−pid
k
...
pid
h
...

≤ Lj,
(33)
An open problem which has not been is not investigated by Nasini et al. [21] is the
formulation of equilibrium conditions for this rationing scheme. One possibility might
be the construction of two intervals for l and L which minimize the overall imbalances,
under the conditions that (33) is verified in each ERP, as long as l and L are inside the
respected intervals. The integrality of the allocation space Λ forbids a straightforward
application of the equilibrium criteria proposed by Dreze [12] to the markets we are
considering in this work.
2.3 Direction of movement: who exchange what?
The sequence of elementary reallocations formalized in (21) requires the iterative choice
of couples of agents (h, k) and couples of commodities (i, j), i.e., directions of movement
among the m(m − 1)n(n − 1)/4 in the neighborhood of the current solution. If we
this choice is based on a welfare function (summarizing the utility functions of all
the agents), the selection of of couples of agents and couples of commodities can be
made mainly in two different ways: first improving and best improving directions of
movement.
The best improving direction requires an exhaustive exploration of the neighbor-
hood. Noting that each direction of movement in the current neighborhood constitutes
a particular ERP, a welfare criterion might be the uncertainty of each elementary real-
location, measured by the number of points in the Pareto frontier of ERPs, as described
in the previous subsection. A usual welfare criterion is a norm of the objective vector
(e.g., Euclidean, L1 or L∞ norms). Also the average marginal rate of substitution could
represent an interesting criterion to select the direction of movement as a high marginal
rate of substitution suggests a kind of mismatch between preferences and endowments.
If at iteration t an improving direction exists the respective endowments are updated
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in accordance with the solution of the selected ERP: for each couple of commodities
(i, j) and each couple of agents (h, k), agent k gives αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh)pjd
k units of i to
agent h and in return he/she gets αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh)pid
k units of j, for some α ∈ Z. At
iteration t+ 1, a second couple of commodities and agents is considered in accordance
with the defined criterion. If we use a first improving criterion, the process stops
when the endowments keep in status quo continuously during m(m − 1)n(n − 1)/4
explorations, i.e., when no improving direction is found in the current neighborhood.
2.4 Linear utilities
In microeconomic theory the utility functions are rarely linear, however the case of
linear objectives appears particularly suitable from an optimization point of view and
allows a remarkable reduction of operations, as the ERPs cannot have more than one
Pareto-efficient solution (see Corollary 1).
Consider a given direction of movement Skhij . We know that a feasible step length
α belongs to the interval defined by (26). Since in the case of one linear objective
the gradient is constant, for any direction of movement (i, j, k, h) the best Pareto im-
provement (if there exists one) must happen in the endpoints of the feasible range of α
(let αdown(i, j, k, h) and αup(i, j, k, h) denote the left and right endpoints of the feasible
range of α, when the direction of movement is (i, j, k, h)). Therefore, the line search
reduces to decide either αdown(i, j, k, h), αup(i, j, k, h) or none of them. Then for ev-
ery given point x, we have a neighborhood of at most m(m− 1)n(n − 1)/2 candidate
solutions.
Despite the idea behind the SER is a process among self-interested agents, which are
by definition local optimizers, this algorithm could also be applied to any integer linear
programming problem with one linear objective: u(x) = cTx. In this case however the
branch and cut algorithm is much more efficient even for big instances, as we will show
in the next section.
If a first-improve method is applied, an order of commodities and agents is required
when exploring the neighborhood and the equilibrium allocation might be highly af-
fected by this order (path-dependence). The pseudocode of algorithm 1 describes the
first improve search of the barter algorithm applied to the case of one linear objective
function.
Note that if the nonnegativity constraints are not taken into account, problem (2) is
unbounded for linear utility functions. This corresponds to the fact that without lower
bounds the linear version of this problem would make people infinitely get into debt.
As a consequence, the only possible stopping criterion, when the objective function
is linear, is the fulfillment of nonnegativity constraints, i.e. a given point x is a final
endowment (an equilibrium of the barter process) if we have that for any direction
of movement and for any given integer α if cT (x + αSkhij ) > c
Tx then x + αSkhij has
some negative component. In some sense the optimality condition is now only based
on feasibility.
2.5 The final allocation and the convergence of the SER
For the case of a continuous commodity space and exogenous prices, pairwise op-
timality implies global optimality, as long as all agents are initially endowed with
some positive amount of a commodity [14]. Unfortunately, the SER described in
this paper does not necessarily lead to Pareto efficient endowments. Let Tx(α) =
x +
∑
k 6=h
∑
i 6=j α(i, j, k, h)S
kh
ij , representing a simultaneous reallocation of m com-
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Algorithm 1 First-improve SER with linear utility function
1: Initialize the endowments E = < e1, . . . , en > and utilities U = < u1, . . . , un >.
2: Let t = 0;
3: Let (i, j, k, h) be the tth direction in the order set of directions;
4: if cT (x+αdown(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) > c
T (x+αup(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) and c
T (x+αdown(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) > c
T (x) then
5: Update the incumbent x = x+ αdown(i, j, k, h)Skhij and GOTO 3;
6: else if cT (x + αup(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) > c
T (x + αdown(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) and c
T (x + αup(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) > c
T (x)
then
7: Update the incumbent x = x+ αup(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) and GOTO 3;
8: else
9: t = t+ 1;
10: if t < m(m− 1)n(n− 1) then
11: GOTO 4;
12: else
13: RETURN
14: end if
15: end if
modities among n agents, with step length αkhij for each couple of commodities ij and
agents hk, starting from x ∈ Λ. Whereas a SER is required to keep feasibility along
the process, a simultaneous reallocation Tx(α) of m commodities among n agents does
not consider the particular path and any feasibility condition on the paths leading from
x to Tx(α). Hence, remembering that all SERs described in this section stop when no
improving elementary reallocation exists in the current neighborhood, we can conclude
that the non existence of a feasible improving ER does not entail the non existence
of an improving simultaneous reallocation of m commodities among n agents. In this
sense a SER provides a lower bound of any sequence of reallocations of more than two
commodities and two agents at a time.
Consider the Lyapunov function U(t) =
∑n
i=1 u
i(x(t)), associating a real value to
each point in the allocation space [29]. As U(t) increases monotonically along the SER
(24) and the allocation space is a finite set, then limt→∞ U(t) = U
∗.
Some understanding of the evolution of U(t) along the SER iteration can be pro-
vided.
Proposition 3. Consider a SER with m commodities among n agents with linear
utility functions, i.e. uh = chx(t), where chi ≤ 1 (the utility functions can be rescaled
by a common constant without affecting the SER). The change in the Lyapunov function
from iteration t− 1 to iteration t is bounded from above by
U(t)− U(t− 1) ≤
qmax
pmin
dmax
dmin
, (34)
where dmax and dmax are the minimum and maximum elements of di ∈ Q, for i =
1 . . . n, as defined in (2); pmin is the minimum price and qmax = max{
∑
h q
h
j : j =
1 . . . m}.
Proof. Let (k, h, i, j) be the direction of movement selected at iteration t of the SER,
x(t) the corresponding allocation and δt = U(t)−U(t−1) be the change in the Lyapunov
function from iteration t− 1 to iteration t. In the general case we have
δt = u
h(x(t) + αSkhij ) + u
k(x(t) + αSkhij )− u
h(x(t))− uk(x(t)), (35)
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which the case of linear utility functions (i.e. uh = chx(t)) becomes
δt = αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh)
([
chi
chi
]T [
pjd
k
−pid
k
]
+
[
chi
chi
]T [
−pjd
h
pid
h
])
, (36)
in accordance with (26). Based on Corollary 2, we have
δt = −max
{
xhi (t)
pjdk
,
xkj (t)
pidh
}([
chi
chi
]T [
pjd
k
−pid
k
]
+
[
chi
chi
]T [
−pjd
h
pid
h
])
, (37a)
if (chi pjd
k - chj pid
k) and (ckj pid
h - cki pjd
h) are negative.
δt = min
{
xhj (t)
pidk
,
xki (t)
pjdh
}([
chi
chi
]T [
pjd
k
−pid
k
]
+
[
chi
chi
]T [
−pjd
h
pid
h
])
, (37b)
if (chi pjd
k - chj pid
k) and (ckj pid
h - cki pjd
h) are positive. Without lose of generality, let
pj ≤ 1 (prices can be rescaled by choosing one commodity as a numeraire). Then, in
the economically meaningful case of having dh = 1, for h = 1 . . . n, we have
δt ≤=
qmax
pmin
dmax
dmin
(38)
since qmax ≥ x
h
i (t), for all h = 1 . . . n and i = 1 . . . n.
In the economically meaningful case of dh = 1, for all h = 1 . . . n, the immediate
economical interpretation of this result is that a high rage of variation of prices might
result in big changes of the aggregated utility, from one bilateral exchange to another.
The effect of the variability of prices on the computational performance of the SER
will be studied in Subsection 4.2.
3 Bartering on networks
An important extension of the problem of bargaining integer amounts of m com-
modities among n agents with fixed prices is to define a network structure such that
trades among agents are allowed only for some couples of agents who are linked in this
network. In this case the conservation of commodities d1x1 + d2x2 + · · · + dnxn =
d1e1 + d2e2 + · · · + dnen is replaced by balance equations on a network, so that the
final allocation of commodity i must verify Ayi = D(xi − ei), where yi is the flow of
commodity i in the system, A is the incidence matrix, and D is a n×n diagonal matrix
containing the weights of the conservation of commodity i, that is D = diag(d1 . . . dn)
(for more details on network flows problems see [1]).
It is also possible for the final allocation to have a given maximum capacity, that
is, an upper bound of the amount of commodity i that agent h may hold: xhi ≤ x¯
h
i .
The variables of the problem are now xhi , which again represent the amount of
commodity i hold by agent h, shi which are the slack variables for the upper bounds,
and yh,ki which are the flow of commodity i from agent h to agent k.
The objective functions u˜i(x,y) , i = 1 . . . n, might depend on both the final alloca-
tion x and the interactions y, since the network topology could represent a structure
of geographical proximity and reachability.
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The resulting mathematical programming formulation of the problem of bargaining
integer commodities with fixed prices among agents on a network with upper bounds
on the final allocations is as follows:
max [u˜i(x,y), i = 1, . . . , n] (39a)
s. to
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. . .
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. . .
. . .
I I
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. . .
A
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 xs
y
 =

b1
...
bn
x¯1
...
x¯n
b0

(39b)
ui(x,y) ≥ ui(e,0) i = 1 . . . , n
x ∈ Zmn ≥ 0, y ∈ Zmn(n−1) ≥ 0,
(39c)
where u˜i : Rmn → R, P ∈ Q1×m, D ∈ Qmn×mn, bi ∈ Q, i = 1, . . . , n, A ∈ Qn×n(n−1),
and b0 ∈ Qnm. Matrix D is an appropriate permutation of the diagonal matrix made
of m copies of the matrix D with the weights of the conservation of commodity and
u˜i(e,0) is the utility function of agent i evaluated in the initial endowments e with null
flow.
Problem (2) had mn variables and m + n constraints, whereas problem (39) has
mn(n+1) variables and n(1+ 2m) constraints. When a SER is applied, the definition
of a network structure and the application of upper bounds to the final allocation
reduce the number of feasible directions of movement in each iteration and the bound
of the interval of feasible step length, as for any incumbent allocation x, the step length
α must be such that 0 ≤ x+ αSkhij ≤ x˜.
The effect of network structures on the performance of a barter process has been
previously studied by Bell [6] and by Wilhite [31], for the case of endogenous prices and
continuous commodity space. In this case the process takes into account how agents
update prices each time they perform a bilateral trade. Reasonably, prices should be
updated based either on the current state of the only two interacting agents or on the
state of the overall population or also on the history of the system, such as previous
prices. Bell showed that centralized network structures, such as a stars, exhibit a faster
convergence to an equilibrium allocation.
It must be noted that any sequence of bilateral trades intrinsically gives rise to
a network structure generated by the set of couples of agents interacting along the
process. Such a structure might be statistically analyzed in term of its topological
properties, as it is done in the next section with a battery of problems of different sizes.
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4 Applications in computational economics
The aim of this section is to provide an inclusive application in the field of com-
putational economics of the mathematical programming based models and methods
proposed thus far. All the data sets used to replicates the results illustrated in this
section can be downloaded from
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/qekoyisyz1bzeej/AACHor8HbYU_KbYopTPxTjzca?dl=0,
along with a Java code implementing the previously described SERs. The reader could
also modify the codes and independently use the same data to run his modified code
and check his hypothesis about social bartering.
4.1 Numerical comparison between the simultaneous reallocation and
the SERs
We first consider the number of ERs required to equilibrate the system and study
their relationship with the size of the problem. In fact a numerical comparison with
a global solver, such as the branch and cut, is provided to evaluate the efficiency of
a decentralized barter economy in comparison with the action of a centralized global
planner.
We have already seen that a SER can also be applied to any integer linear pro-
gramming problem of the form (2), where the individual utilities are aggregated in a
single welfare function. If this aggregated welfare is defined as a linear function of the
endowments of the form u(x) = cTx, the comparison of the SERs with the standard
branch and cut algorithm is easily carried out.
Considering the ERP as the basic operation of a SER and the simplex iteration as
the basic operation of the branch and cut algorithm, the comparison between the two
methods is numerically shown in Table 1 for three replications of 11 problems with the
same number of agents and commodities, which amounts to 33 instances. The branch
and cut implementation of the state-of-the-art optimization solver Cplex was used.
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size initial welfare
first-improve best-improve branch and cut
neighborhood ERPs solution ERPs solution simplex solution
10 75.134 0.66 267 353.269 91 365.126 87 394.630
10 147.958 0.84 271 763.188 91 767.371 12 769.861
10 1.205.972 0.77 375 3.925.921 74 3.844.165 70 4.060.685
15 297.713 0.70 1.343 1.455.839 215 1.471.387 49 1.488.149
15 326.996 0.71 1.090 2.544.271 237 2.554.755 63 2.614.435
15 625.800 0.71 806 2.640.317 224 2.644.008 76 2.684.016
20 183.573 0.67 2.759 3.432.832 378 3.425.665 110 3.525.421
20 1.064.023 0.81 1.582 4.197.757 361 4.194.187 94 4.331.940
20 201.377 0.78 2.629 1.017.906 351 1.089.860 80 1.180.977
25 228.365 0.89 4.358 2.221.790 648 2.226.152 237 2.271.552
25 687.492 0.65 2.806 3.416.982 572 3.403.937 113 3.462.043
25 323.495 0.61 4.706 2.262.657 666 2.245.817 50 2.474.429
30 973.955 0.79 6.648 5.428.473 975 5.427.207 101 5.377.843
30 1.811.905 0.82 13.126 8.945.605 1.084 8.953.611 127 9.080.651
30 1.302.404 0.85 12.089 7.583.841 957 7.573.400 132 7.605.525
35 653.739 0.87 13.201 3.456.918 1.310 3.458.570 112 3.474.126
35 564.905 0.80 8.772 3.579.713 1.308 3.585.815 77 3.599.639
35 753.056 0.83 14.199 5.132.226 1.290 5.107.933 67 5.333.123
40 482.570 0.87 16.307 2.429.707 1.608 2.428.731 145 2.446.953
40 430.174 0.68 7.885 5.281.060 1.640 5.229.740 90 5.279.631
40 2.795.862 0.79 14.240 19.175.278 1.578 14.503.963 186 19.276.444
45 3.392.010 0.98 62.398 22.681.229 2.300 22.664.443 162 22.728.195
45 842.645 0.92 12.900 6.606.875 2.137 6.642.397 204 6.755.016
45 1.909.859 0.97 48.688 15.979.841 2.173 15.865.744 180 16.071.407
50 839.559 0.93 20.615 4.822.082 2.105 4.859.830 137 4.895.655
50 718.282 0.97 20.744 3.586.560 2.459 3.588.633 160 3.610.194
50 1.570.652 0.99 58.165 18.872.864 2.530 19.018.519 180 19.069.868
55 351.051 0.98 20.344 2.761.203 2.935 2.748.862 1.242 2.799.187
55 413.656 0.96 26.780 4.566.394 2.922 4.569.975 336 4.585.475
55 551.355 0.99 32.053 5.136.295 3.139 5.135.647 253 5.157.444
60 468.575 0.99 27.208 1.941.409 3.568 1.949.786 271 1.995.930
60 501.366 0.99 34.323 5.051.429 3.521 5.051.836 313 5.067.154
60 575.950 0.98 43.227 4.751.072 3.589 4.747.097 273 4.801.179
Table 1: Numerical results of the SER and Branch and Cut for different instances of problem (2). The first column
shows the number of agents and commodities of the problem. Columns ’ERPs’ provide the number of elementary
reallocations and column ’neighborhood’ shows the proportion of neighborhood which has been explored. Columns
’solution’ give the maximum total utility found. Column ’simplex’ gives the number of simplex iterations performed
by branch and cut.
The numerical results in Table 1 shows 33 problems where the number of agents and
commodities is the same, as reported in the first column. For each of the 11 different
sizes 3 replicates are computed.
The second column of Table 1 shows the initial levels of social welfare, cTe. Columns
solution give the maximum utility found for the three respective methods (first-improve
local search, best-improve local search, branch and cut algorithms).
The first-improve local search results in a reduced neighborhood explorations along
the sequence of movements, as suggested by the values in the column neighborhood,
which show the proportion of possible combination of agents and commodities explored
before moving to an improving direction (in comparison to the wholem(m−1)n(n−1)/4
candidate solutions).
The fourth and fifth columns of Tab. 1, named ’ERP’, reports the number of
movements, i.e. the number of ERPs for which the step-length α (as defined in (26))
has been non-null. The first-improve local search gives rise to a higher amount of
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ERPs, in comparison with the best-improve version. In addition, in most of the cases
the best-improve search results in better allocations, as their value appear particularly
close to the optimal solution (see the seventh and ninth columns of Tab. 1).
On the other hand, when competing with the simultaneous reallocation of all M
commodities among the N agents, the sequence of best-improve elementary reallo-
cations fails to reach comparatively good results in terms of number of elementary
operations performed and goodness of the achieved final allocation.
The scatter plots in figures 2 and 3 show the relationship between the problem
size (number of agents and commodities) and the elementary operations required for
convergence (the ERPs for the best-improve SER and simplex iteration for the branch
and cut), with the least square interpolation of algebraical curves and R2 coefficient of
determination.
ERPs = β0 + β1(size)
β0 = −946.2, β1 = 69.5
R2 = 0.270
Figure 2: Scatter plot and least square approximation of a straight line through the relationship between the
problem size and the number of ERPs for the best-improve SER method.
simplex = β0 + β1(size)
β0 = −63.4, β1 = 6.76
R2 = 0.270
Figure 3: Scatter plot and least square approximation of a straight line through the relationship between the
problem size and the number of simplex iteration for the branch and cut.
The scatter plots and least square approximation in Fig. 4 and 5 tries to explain
the relationship between the problem size and the number of elementary operations
(ERPs for the best-improve SER and the simplex pivots for the branch and cut) by an
exponential curve of the form y = β0 exp(β1x), with the corresponding R
2 coefficient
of determination. The same kind of plots are shown in Fig. 6 and 7 for the least square
interpolation of a polynomial curve of the form y = β0x
β1 .
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ERPs = β0 exp(β1size)
β0 = 85.8, β1 = 0.068
R2 = 0.919
Figure 4: Scatter plot and least square approximation of an exponential curve through the relationship between
the problem size and the number of ERPs for the best-improve SER method.
simplex = β0 exp(β1size)
β0 = 31.4, β1 = 0.039
R2 = 0.602
Figure 5: Scatter plot and least square approximation of an exponential curve through the relationship between
the problem size and the number of simplex iteration for the branch and cut.
ERPs = β0(size)
β1
β0 = 0.79, β1 = 2.07
R2 = 0 : 995
Figure 6: Scatter plot and least square approximation of a polynomial curve of the form y = β0xβ1 through the
relationship between the problem size and the number of ERPs for the best-improve SER method.
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simplex = β0(size)
β1
β0 = 2.84, β1 = 1.100
R2 = 0.567
Figure 7: Scatter plot and least square approximation of a polynomial curve through the relationship between the
problem size and the number of simplex iteration for the branch and cut.
This results quite clearly suggest a quadratic growth of the expected ERPs with
respect to the size of the problem, in accordance with the a coefficient of determination
of 0.995. Instead the number simplex iteration of the branch and cut algorithm seems
not to be well fitted by any of the proposed curves.
From the same computational view, other sequences of reallocation have been stud-
ied by Bell [6], who analyzed the performance of the process under a variety of network
structures restricting the interactions to be performed only among adjacent agents.
She studied a population of Cobb Douglas’ agents trading continuous amount of two
commodities with local Walrasian prices and focused on the speed of convergence to
an equilibrium price and allocation, observing that more centralized networks converge
with fewer trades and have less residual price variation than more diverse networks.
Bell relied only on the number of trades as a measure of the speed of convergence,
which we regarded as movements in the local search formalizing the process. Instead,
ten years ago Wilhite [31] also toke into account the cost imposed by searching and
negotiating, which we regarded as the exploration of the neighborhood1.
4.2 The effect of preferences, prices, endowments
The aim of this section is to study how the initial condition of the economy, that
is to say, preferences, prices and endowments, are able to affect the computational
performance of the barter processes previously defined and the emerging social structure
of economical interaction.
A first question when sequences of elementary reallocations are studied might be
related to the analysis of which initial condition of the system is more likely to affect
the number of non dominated allocations (improving directions), the number of ne-
gotiations (neighborhoods explored) and the emerging structure of interaction among
agents.
To study the number of non dominated allocations obtained as a result of sequences
of elementary reallocations, a method for the enumeration of all possible non-dominated
1Note that in the special case of being interested in an aggregate social welfare, a system of many local optimizers
(agents) could be highly inefficient if compared with a global optimizer, who acts for the ’goodness’ of the system,
as in the case of branch and cut. Also the increase of elementary operation of the barter algorithm is much higher
than the one of the branch and cut, particularly when the direction of movement is selected in a best-improve way,
as it is shown in Table 1. The economical interpretation suggests that if the time taken to reach an equilibrium
allocation is too long, it is possible that this equilibrium is eventually never achieved in real social systems, where
perturbing events (change in preferences, appetence of new types of commodities, etc.) might take place.
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paths from the known initial endowments is described. To do so, the m(m − 1)n(n −
1)/4 directions are explored in each step in such a way that a bundle non dominated
reallocations are kept. Let r be the number of non-dominated reallocation in the first
iteration; for each i = 1, . . . , r a collection of li ≤ m(m− 1)n(n− 1)/4 non-dominated
directions are obtained. The bundle of non-dominated solutions are thus updated in
each wave by adding and allocation in accordance with this enumerative procedure.
This procedure requires a method to find Pareto-optimal vectors each time m(m−
1)n(n − 1)/4 ERPs are solved. Corley and Moon [10] proposed an algorithm to find
the set V ∗ of Pareto vectors among r given vectors V = {v1, v2, . . . , vr}, where vi =
(vi1, vi2, . . . , vin) ∈ R
n, i = 1, 2, . . . , r. Sastry and Mohideen [26] observed that the
latter algorithm is incorrect and presented a modified version. In our implementation
of the the best-improve barter process, we use the modified Corley and Moon algorithm
of [26], shown below.
Step 1. Set i = 1, j = 2.
Step 2. If i = r − 1, go to Step 6. For k = 1, 2, . . . , n, if vjk ≤ vik, then go to Step 3; else, if
vik ≤ vjk, then go to Step 4. Otherwise, go to Step 5.
Step 3. Set i = i+ 1, j = i+ 1; go to Step 2.
Step 4. If j = r, put vi ∈ vminV and vj = {∞,∞, . . . ,∞}; go to Step 3. Otherwise, set
vjk = vrk, where k = 1, 2, . . . , n; set r = r − 1 and go to Step 2.
Step 5. If j = r, put vi ∈ vminV ; go to Step 3. Otherwise, set j = j + 1 and go to Step 2.
Step 6. For k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, if vjk ≤ vik, then put vj ∈ vminV and stop; else, if vik ≤ vjk,
then put vi ∈ vmin V and stop; Otherwise, put vi, vj ∈ vmin V and stop.
The nice property of the modified Corley and Moon algorithm is that it doesn’t nec-
essarily compare each of the r(r−1)/2 couples of vectors for each of the n components.
This is actually what the algorithm do in the worst case, so that the complexity could
be written as O(nr2), which is linear with respect of the dimension of the vectors and
quadratic with respect to the number of vectors.
The pseudo-code to generate all sequences of elementary reallocations for n linear
agents, keeping the Pareto-improvement in each interaction, is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Generating paths of all improving directions of movement
1: Initialize the endowments E = < q1, . . . ,qn > and utilities U = < u1, . . . , un >.
2: Initialize the incumbent allocations E˜t = {E} and the incumbent utilities U˜ t = {U}.
3: repeat
4: for v ∈ E˜t do
5: Let < Sx, Gx > be the set of movements and utilities {(x+ αS
kh
ij , c
′(x+ αSkhij ))} for each couple
of commodities and agents (i, j, k, h) and α ∈ {αdown(i, j, k, h), αup(i, j, k, h)}
6: end for
7: Let < S,G >=
⋃
x∈E˜
< Sv, Uv > and < S,G >= CorleyMoon(< S,G >)
8: Let E˜t+1 = E˜t ∪ S and U˜ t+1 = U˜ t ∪G
9: Let t = t+ 1
10: until E˜t = E˜t−1
The function CorleyMoon() applies the modified Corley and Moon algorithm to
a set of utility vectors and allocation vectors and return the Pareto-efficient utility
vectors with the associated allocations.
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allocations utilities
iteration 0 18 3 3 13 4 55 22 2 2 1422 559 1220
iteration 1 21 3 0 10 4 58 22 2 2 1608 574 1220
18 3 3 11 4 57 24 2 0 1422 569 1324
iteration 2 24 0 0 7 7 58 22 2 2 1800 571 1220
19 5 0 10 4 58 24 0 2 1480 574 1326
21 3 0 8 6 58 24 0 2 1608 572 1326
21 3 0 8 4 60 24 2 0 1608 584 1324
21 3 0 10 6 56 22 0 4 1422 567 1430
21 0 3 8 7 57 24 2 0 1614 566 1324
iteration 3 21 3 0 8 4 60 24 2 0 1608 584 1324
22 2 0 7 7 58 24 0 2 1672 571 1326
24 0 0 5 9 58 24 0 2 1800 569 1326
24 0 0 5 7 60 24 2 0 1800 581 1324
24 0 0 7 9 56 22 0 4 1614 564 1430
19 5 0 8 4 60 26 0 0 1480 584 1430
19 5 0 10 2 60 24 2 0 1480 586 1324
21 1 2 8 6 58 24 2 0 1608 582 1430
iteration 4 21 3 0 8 4 60 24 2 0 1608 584 1324
24 0 0 5 7 60 24 2 0 1800 581 1324
19 5 0 8 4 60 26 0 0 1480 584 1430
19 5 0 10 2 60 24 2 0 1480 586 1324
21 1 2 8 6 58 24 2 0 1608 582 1430
21 3 0 8 6 58 24 0 2 1800 579 1430
22 0 2 7 9 56 24 0 2 1672 581 1430
24 0 0 7 7 58 22 2 2 1736 582 1324
20 2 2 7 7 58 26 0 0 1672 583 1324
iteration 5 21 3 0 8 4 60 24 2 0 1608 584 1324
24 0 0 5 7 60 24 2 0 1800 581 1324
19 5 0 8 4 60 26 0 0 1480 584 1430
19 5 0 10 2 60 24 2 0 1480 586 1324
21 1 2 8 6 58 24 2 0 1608 582 1430
21 3 0 8 6 58 24 0 2 1800 579 1430
22 0 2 7 9 56 24 0 2 1672 581 1430
24 0 0 7 7 58 22 2 2 1736 582 1324
20 2 2 7 7 58 26 0 0 1672 583 1324
21 0 3 8 7 57 24 2 0 1544 583 1430
Figure 8: Worked example of the generation of all possible SERs, as described in algorithm 2.
Consider a barter process of 3 commodities among 3 agents and let the initial
endowments be q1 = (18 3 3), q2 = (13 4 55) and q3 = (22 2 2). The coefficients of
the linear objective functions are c1 = (75 11 13), c2 = (4 3 9) and c3 = (55 2 3).
Starting from the initial solution, the sequence of two-agent-two-commodity barter
leads to the movements of Figure 8.
The scale of grey denotes the utility level. Starting from the initial endowments,
28 different stories of elementary reallocations might be generated, although many of
them lead to the same stable allocation (local optima). We found 11 stable allocations
which might be reached by some sequence of elementary allocation keeping the Pareto-
optimality in each ERP.
We consider a theoretical case where 2 agents with linear utility functions have to
trade 9 commodities. The following three factors are taken into account:
- Fact1: the variability of prices;
- Fact2: association between q
1 and c1 and between q2 and c2 (initial stability);
- Fact3: association between q
1 and c2 and between q2 and c1 (dissortative matching).
The aforementioned factors are measured at three levels and 4 randomized replicates
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have been simulated for each combination of factors. A multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) is performed, considering the two following response variables
- Resp1: the number of non dominated allocations;
- Resp2: the number of neighborhoods explored.
The MANOVA results2 in Table 2 illustrates the effects and the significance of Fact3,
corresponding to the association between the initial endowments and the marginal util-
ities of opposite agents. The correlation between the amounts of the initial endowments
and the coefficients of the objective function of the same agent does not appear by itself
to have a significant effect on the response variables.
df Pillai approx F p-value
Fact1 2 0.098426 2.3033 0.06028
Fact2 2 0.034673 0.7851 0.53624
Fact3 2 0.133653 3.1867 0.01474
Fact1 × Fact2 4 0.037110 0.4207 0.90758
Fact1 × Fact3 4 0.070324 0.8109 0.59384
Fact2 × Fact3 4 0.166118 2.0155 0.04701
Residuals 89
Table 2: MANOVA analysis of the paths of all improving directions
The graphical illustration in Figure 9 supports the MANOVA results, by showing the
values of the two response variables for each level of the factors. The price variability
seems to have a non-linear effect to both response variables (left panel). The association
between the initial endowment and the marginal utility of the same agent doesn’t seem
to produce a consistent change in the number of neighborhoods explored (red line in
the central panel), though it does have a clear average linear effect on the number of
non-dominated allocations. Differently, the correlation between the initial endowment
of an agent and the coefficients of the utility function of the other exhibits negative
associations with the two response variables.
2The multiple analysis of variance is used to compare multivariate (population) means of several combinations
of factors. The third and fourth columns of Table 2 report commonly used test statistics which provide a p-value
assuming an F distribution under the null hypothesis.
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Figure 9: The numerical results associated to Table 2 are shown. The dotted red lines denote the number of
non-dominated allocations, whereas the continuous green lines denote the number of of neighborhoods explored.
This experimental result should interpreted as exploratory and aiming to provide
clues and suggestions for further analysis about the effect of the initial condition of the
system on the outcomes and performance of the SERs. In this respect, the significant
effects of dissortative matching advise for the analysis of the dissortative behavior of
the economical interaction network.
Any SER intrinsically gives rise to two types of network structures generated by the
set of couples of agents interacting along the process:
- the between–node–interaction network (whose edge set is represented by the number of
exchanges, that is to say, the number of times a ERP is solved per each couple of agents),
- the between–node–flow network (whose edge set is represented by amount of exchanged
commodities for each couple of agents).
Both networks can be seen as dynamically changing along the process. Such structures
might be statistically analyzed in term of their topological properties. We consider
three kind of assortativity measures reflecting the preference for an agent to interact
with others that are similar or different in some ways:
- Type1: couples of agents with highly different marginal utilities are more often commercial
partners: ρ(δ(ch, ck), xhk);
- Type2: agents who are more sociable (trade more often) interact frequently with agents
who are not sociable: ρ(δ(fh, fk), xhk)–;
- Type3: the more two agents are different with respect to their marginal utilities, the more
they are different with respect to their commercial interactions: ρ(δ(ch, ck), δ(fh, fk)).
The Greek letter δ denotes the Euclidean distance, ρ is the Pearson correlation, xhk
is the valued of the connection between agent h and k and fh is the total value of
connections of agent h, corresponding to the hth row of the AM. The numerical values
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in Table 3 corresponds to the aforementioned assortativities applied to the interaction
network, corresponding to the instances of Table 1.
Size
Between–node–flow Between–node–interaction
Type1 Type2 Type3 Type1 Type2 Type3
10 0.40 0.48 0.63 0.70 0.67 0.74
10 0.46 0.66 0.61 0.85 0.63 0.74
10 0.60 0.48 0.75 0.71 0.70 0.75
15 0.47 0.31 0.62 0.74 0.48 0.56
15 0.33 0.36 0.58 0.58 0.44 0.67
15 0.24 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.74 0.66
20 0.28 0.41 0.61 0.39 0.62 0.54
20 0.23 0.18 0.46 0.54 0.48 0.55
20 0.12 0.06 0.37 0.48 0.45 0.42
25 0.14 0.18 0.39 0.55 0.66 0.53
25 0.36 0.32 0.60 0.65 0.56 0.66
25 0.14 0.17 0.51 0.48 0.70 0.49
30 0.09 0.08 0.40 0.42 0.55 0.53
30 0.24 0.20 0.67 0.56 0.62 0.68
30 0.26 0.33 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.65
35 0.11 0.29 0.40 0.44 0.59 0.43
35 0.14 0.28 0.50 0.46 0.55 0.48
35 0.14 0.26 0.49 0.46 0.58 0.53
40 0.25 0.22 0.53 0.44 0.64 0.58
40 0.28 0.23 0.58 0.68 0.52 0.64
40 0.26 0.18 0.69 0.64 0.64 0.60
45 0.23 0.30 0.55 0.62 0.60 0.54
45 0.29 0.24 0.61 0.57 0.59 0.58
45 0.21 0.21 0.63 0.58 0.57 0.61
50 0.08 0.28 0.36 0.35 0.55 0.32
50 0.16 0.32 0.41 0.45 0.62 0.42
50 0.24 0.17 0.60 0.51 0.50 0.65
55 0.14 0.53 0.17 0.39 0.52 0.48
55 0.17 0.33 0.38 0.29 0.53 0.44
55 0.19 0.37 0.38 0.47 0.56 0.43
60 0.35 0.45 0.60 0.54 0.57 0.62
60 0.20 0.30 0.43 0.34 0.50 0.52
60 0.16 0.38 0.29 0.39 0.51 0.48
Table 3: Three types of network assortativity.
The significative effect of Fact3 (the association between the initial endowment and
the marginal utility of the other agent) in the MANOVA of Table 2 seems coherent with
the Type1 assortativity reported in Table 3, in the vague sense that the difference in
the agents marginal utilities is likely to result in high exchange opportunities for agents
and, conversely, in many possible convenient allocations (in the sense of Pareto).
Surprisingly, as far as the network corresponding to the between–node–flow is con-
cerned, the Type3 assortativity appear comparatively higher then the others. It might
be argued that this is due to the fact that nodes with similar marginal utilities have
similar abilities in catching the same exchange opportunities existing in the market.
An analogous result is observed for the networks corresponding to the between–node–
interaction.
Regarding the Type2 dissortativity of the between–node–interaction, the values in
Table 3 provide a clear connections with the results of Cook et al. [9], who observed that
most central nodes (in the sense of eigenvector centrality) were not the most successful
in achieving high bargaining power. It can be argued that this achievement relies on
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his/her connections with poorly connected nodes3, as noted by Bonacich [5]:
in bargaining situations, it is advantageous to be connected to those who have few
options; power comes from being connected to those who are powerless. Being con-
nected to powerful others who have many potential trading partners reduces one’s
bargaining power.
Note that the goodness of being connected with powerful or powerless neighbors
depends on the type of commodity flowing within the network. If the utility of nodes
are related to the amount of obtained information, the non rival nature of informa-
tion suggests a positive association between the power of a node and the power of its
neighbors.
The dissortative behavior of the valued networks generated by the barter process
can be probabilistically analyzed using conditionally uniform random network models.
For each of the three problems of size 60 in Table 1, the results in Table 4 show
the sample mean and standard deviation of the clustering coefficient and assortativity
coefficient of a sample of 20.000 valued networks with fixed density (summation of the
AM components).
Network Property sample mean sample std. observed value one tail p-value corr CC – AC
CC 0.0583 0.0099 0.0107 0.9951 0.1075
AC -0.0181 0.0054 -0.0454 0.0000
CC 0.0613 0.0114 0.0101 0.9951 -0.0847
F
lo
w AC -0.0196 0.0056 -0.0491 0.0000
CC 0.0615 0.0096 0.0390 0.9974 0.1387
AC -0.0188 0.0058 -0.0316 0.0379
CC 0.0901 0.0092 0.0822 0.7832 -0.1125
In
te
ra
ct
io
n AC -0.0220 0.0110 -0.0454 0.0220
CC 0.1085 0.0050 0.1125 0.0992 0.1344
AC -0.0221 0.0115 -0.0491 0.0027
CC 0.1125 0.0042 0.1178 0.0576 -0.0250
AC -0.0203 0.0128 -0.0326 0.0411
Table 4: Numerical results from the sample obtained with the q-kernel method, for each of the six networks
associated to the the three barter processes of size 60 in Table 1. The model is based on the conditionally uniform
distribution of valued networks with fixed density (summation of the AM components). The sixth column reports
the left-tailed p-values.
Similarly, for the same samples of Table 4, the results in Table 5 show the sample
mean and standard deviation of the clustering coefficient and assortativity coefficient
of a sample of 10.000 valued networks with fixed row marginal of the AM generated by
the q-kernel method.
3This results contradict most social psychological literature showing that, in experimentally restricted communi-
cation networks, the leadership role typically devolves upon the individual in the most central position [19, 7]
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Network Property sample mean sample std. observed value one tail p-value corr CC – AC
CC 0.0170 0.0031 0.0107 0.9833 0.0462
AC -0.0079 0.0053 -0.0454 0.0000
CC 0.0177 0.0041 0.0101 1.0000 0.0286
F
lo
w AC -0.0064 0.0060 -0.0491 0.0000
CC 0.0433 0.0072 0.0390 0.7895 -0.0462
AC -0.0144 0.0073 -0.0316 0.0092
CC 0.0515 0.0182 0.0822 0.1179 0.0067
In
te
ra
ct
io
n AC -0.0251 0.0102 -0.0454 0.0339
CC 0.0848 0.0168 0.1125 0.0870 -0.1542
AC -0.0173 0.0143 -0.0491 0.0254
CC 0.0633 0.0169 0.6384 0.0332 0.0932
AC -0.0154 0.0101 -0.4786 0.0433
Table 5: Numerical results from the sample obtained with the q-kernel method, for each of the six networks
associated to the the three barter processes of size 60 in Table 1. The model is based on the conditionally uniform
distribution of valued networks with row marginal density. The sixth column reports the left-tailed p-values.
The results in tables 4 and 5 are quite confirmatory, as the negative values of the CC
and AC between row marginal can not be explained based on the supposed conditional
randomness.
In a series of computational experiments Kang [18] showed an interesting relation-
ship between the variation at the individual level of a network and its assortative
behavior. He found that when actors are connected with similarly central alters, the
overall variation at the individual centralities (network centralization) is low.
The global picture emerging from the observed computational results strongly sup-
ports the previously discussed micromacro linkages. This is particularly true when the
dissortative pattern and the network centralization are taken into account [19, 7, 9, 18].
Indeed, this strategic model of network formation is capable of internalizing many and
varied assumption on agent behavior, allowing to test hypothesis on the arising of open
and closed network structures from the economical interaction.
5 Summary and future directions
We studied the use of barter processes for solving problems of bargaining on a
discrete set, representing markets with indivisible goods and fixed exogenous prices.
We showed that the allocation space is characterized by a block diagonal system of
linear constraints, whose structural properties might be exploited in the construction
and analysis of barter processes. Using Proposition 2 and the characterization of the
space of integer solutions of the ERP, we were able to derive a constructive procedure
to obtain its Pareto frontier, as shown by Corollary 1 and Corollary 2.
Further research on this topic should include the characterization of the integer
points in the null space of a general reallocation problem with fixed prices to obtain
a closed form solution of a general problem of reallocating integer amounts of m com-
modities among n agents with fixed prices.
An open problem, which has not been investigated in this paper, is the formulation
of equilibrium conditions for this rationing scheme proposed in Section 3, as suggested
by Dreze [12] for the case of continuous allocation space.
In Section 4 we proposed a mathematical programming model for the problem of
reallocating integer amounts of m commodities among n agents with fixed prices on a
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sparse network structure with nodal capacities. Further research on this issue should
include a mathematical properties of a SER in dealing with markets with sparsely
connected agents, as formulated in (39).
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